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Non-technical Summary 
 
Much of the literature on banking in emerging markets focuses on either the broad 
relationship between ownership and financial performance or the agency aspect of ownership, 
i.e., the impact of separation between management and ownership on the performance of banks. 
The focus on the relationship between ownership and financial performance of banks in 
emerging markets stems from concern about both the possibility of inefficient allocation of 
scarce financial resources in the presence of dominant public sector banks that often manifest 
McKinnon-Shaw type financial repression, and also from the concern about the possible fiscal 
impact of banking sector fragility in an environment where directed credit, political patronage, 
and severe moral hazard on the part of public sector bank officials can lead to significant 
accumulation of non-performing assets (NPAs). 
While the focus on ownership is not completely unjustified in the context of banks in 
emerging markets, it has drawn attention away from the fact that, unlike a manufacturing or 
services sector firm, a bank helps mobilize domestic savings for subsequent investment in 
various on-going and new projects, and thereby is also the conduit for the transmission of 
monetary policy, and the facilitator of economic growth. Indeed, it is now stylized in the 
literature that the intermediary role of banks plays an important role in encouraging growth, even 
though in some countries a well-functioning credit market has added the unwelcome effect of 
increasing debt accumulation rather than improving total factor productivity. Thus, not only are 
allocative efficiency and financial performance of banks important, but so also is the amount of 
credit disbursed by these financial intermediaries. 
The fallacy of analysis that emphasizes bank ownership, with the prior that private 
ownership is better than public ownership, is evident. While private ownership may improve 
allocative efficiency in the credit market, at least so long as the market is not subjected to 
financial repression, there is evidence to suggest that it may be detrimental to credit disbursal, if 
the risks associated with this are significantly high. For example, the International Monetary 
Fund noted that subsequent to privatization of banks in Bulgaria, following the banking-currency 
crisis of 1996-97, the banking sector was reluctant to lend in the high-risk environment, resulting 
in a ratio of private sector credit to GDP of about 12 percent.  This is compared to the optimal 
value of this ratio for a country with Bulgaria’s per capita GDP of around 30 percent. Latin 
American evidence suggests that foreign banks are especially risk averse and that significant   3
market penetration by these banks in a developing economy context might adversely affect credit 
disbursal to small and medium enterprises. 
However, some economists have argued that credit rationing on account of risk 
averseness is not specific to domestic and foreign private banks. Using Indian data, they show 
that public sector or government owned banks can also exhibit such risk averseness, albeit more 
on account of the political economy of blame sharing in the event of poor bank performance than 
profit motives. That is, the behavior of banks in emerging economy credit markets may not be a 
monotonic function of ownership; credit disbursal by banks in inherently high risk markets may 
be depend on a host of other factors. Hence, it is worthwhile exploring the credit market behavior 
of banks in an emerging market context. 
Using bank-level data from India, for nine years (1995-96 to 2003-04), and fixed effects 
panel data models, we examine banks’ behavior in the context of emerging credit markets. Our 
results indicate that the credit market behavior of banks in emerging markets is determined by 
past trends, the diversity of the potential pool of borrowers to whom a bank can lend, and 
regulations regarding treatment of NPA and lending restrictions imposed by the Reserve Bank of 
India. Finally, we find evidence that suggest that credit disbursal by banks can be facilitated by 
regulatory and institutional changes that help banks mitigate the problems associated with 
enforcement of debt covenants and treatment of NPA on the balance sheets. The results are 
remarkably robust with respect to the choice of the explanatory variables, and the measure of key 
variables like the credit-to-deposit ratio of the banks. On the basis of these results, we speculate 
on some possible policy recommendations. Our policy recommendation includes the 
development of the market for corporate securities, especially in ways that reduces liquidity risk 
for these securities, such that there is a relatively low-risk way for Indian banks to deliver credit 
to the economy. 
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The Risk Aversion of Banks in Emerging Credit markets: 
Evidence from India 
 
1. Background 
Much of the literature on banking in emerging markets focuses on either the broad 
relationship between ownership and financial performance (e.g., Sarkar, Sarkar and Bhaumik, 
1998) or the agency aspect of ownership, i.e., the impact of separation between management and 
ownership on the performance of banks (e.g., Gorton and Schmid, 1999; Hirshey, 1999). The 
focus on the relationship between ownership and financial performance of banks in emerging 
markets stems from concern about both the possibility of inefficient allocation of scarce financial 
resources in the presence of dominant public sector banks that often manifest McKinnon-Shaw 
type financial repression, and also from the concern about the possible fiscal impact of banking 
sector fragility in an environment where directed credit, political patronage, and severe moral 
hazard on the part of public sector bank officials can lead to significant accumulation of non-
performing assets (NPAs). 
While the focus on ownership is not completely unjustified in the context of banks in 
emerging markets, it has drawn attention away from the fact that, unlike a manufacturing or 
services sector firm, a bank helps mobilize domestic savings for subsequent investment in 
various on-going and new projects, and thereby is also the conduit for the transmission of 
monetary policy, and the facilitator of economic growth. Indeed, it is now stylized in the 
literature that the intermediary role of banks plays an important role in encouraging growth, even 
though in some countries a well-functioning credit market has added the unwelcome effect of 
increasing debt accumulation rather than improving total factor productivity (Gertler and 
Gilchrist, 1993; Ketkar, 1993; Ma and Smith, 1996; Bulir, 1998; Acemoglu, 2001; Bell and 
Rousseau, 2001; Da Rin and Hellman, 2002; Jeong, Kymn and Kymn, 2003). Thus, not only are 
allocative efficiency and financial performance of banks important, but so also is the amount of 
credit disbursed by these financial intermediaries. 
The fallacy of analysis that emphasizes bank ownership, with the prior that private 
ownership is better than public ownership, is evident. While private ownership may improve 
allocative efficiency in the credit market, at least so long as the market is not subjected to 
financial repression, there is evidence to suggest that it may be detrimental to credit disbursal, if   6
the risks associated with this are significantly high. For example, the International Monetary 
Fund (2000) noted that subsequent to privatization of banks in Bulgaria, following the banking-
currency crisis of 1996-97, the banking sector was reluctant to lend in the high-risk environment, 
resulting in a ratio of private sector credit to GDP of about 12 percent.  This is compared to the 
optimal value of this ratio for a country with Bulgaria’s per capita GDP of around 30 percent. 
Latin American evidence suggests that foreign banks are especially risk averse and that 
significant market penetration by these banks in a developing economy context might adversely 
affect credit disbursal to small and medium enterprises (Clarke, Cull, D’Amato and Molinari, 
1999; Clarke, Cull, and Peria 2001; Clarke, Cull, Peria and Sanchez, 2002). 
However, Banerjee and Duflo (2002) have argued that credit rationing on account of risk 
averseness is not specific to domestic and foreign private banks. Using Indian data, they show 
that public sector or government owned banks can also exhibit such risk averseness, albeit more 
on account of the political economy of blame sharing in the event of poor bank performance than 
profit motives. That is, the behavior of banks in emerging economy credit markets may not be a 
monotonic function of ownership; credit disbursal by banks in inherently high risk markets may 
be depend on a host of other factors. Hence, it is worthwhile exploring the credit market behavior 
of banks in an emerging market context. 
The main problem in extending the Banerjee and Duflo approach to a larger proportion of 
the banking sector in India, or indeed any other developing country, is that it requires data on all 
credit related transactions of the banks.  Indeed, the data used by Banerjee and Duflo itself is 
very limited, restricted to the activities of one Indian public sector bank that accounted for about 
5 percent of banking sector assets when the analysis was undertaken.  Therefore, in this paper, 
we propose to address this important issue using an alternative methodology for which time 
series data is available for all banks operating in India. 
Banks in India have the choice of investing resources in safe government bonds, or risky 
credit instruments. Ceteris paribus, a bank has to choose the allocation of resources between the 
riskless and risky assets, and this choice is manifested in the credit-to-deposit ratio (CDR). We 
then define and estimate a model that expresses CDR as a function of the credit risk associated 
with the banks’ potential borrower pool, and the risk averseness of the banks.  As in the literature 
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2002), we also use a lagged dependent variable in the specification, to 
allow for persistence in the CDR. The estimation uses a fixed effects model, in keeping with the   7
test statistics generated by Hausman tests that enable choice between fixed and random effects 
models. The robustness of our results is verified by measuring CDR in two different ways, and 
by using two different samples, firstly the domestic banks and second domestic and foreign. 
The choice of India is justified as the Indian banking sector has a multiple ownership 
structure, comprising public sector banks, incumbent and de novo private domestic sector banks, 
and foreign banks.  In addition, significant reforms and liberalization has taken place since the 
early 1990s (Sarkar, Sarkar and Bhaumik, 1998, Shirai and Rajsekaran, 2001; Bhaumik and 
Mukherjee, 2002), thereby granting all banks effective operational autonomy. Recent literature 
has found evidence of convergence among these different types of Indian banks in terms of 
financial performance (Bhaumik and Dimova, 2004), indicating that they have taken advantage 
of the reforms to compete with each other, and learn from each other sufficiently to be able to 
invade each other’s market niches. However, the existing literature does not indicate whether 
there has also been a convergence in the credit market behavior of the different types of banks, 
with respect to credit disbursal. At the same time, despite a large market capitalization by 
developing country standards, banks remain the main source of capital for most micro, small and 
medium enterprises. Hence, Indian banking provides an ideal setting for further analysis. 
Our analysis confirms that of Banerjee and Duflo (2002), suggesting there is a strong 
persistence in the CDR, whether due to the relationship nature of the business, or the inability of 
a large proportion of the banks to assess credit risk associated with individual loan applications 
effectively. Our results also indicate that Reserve Bank of India (RBI) regulations regarding 
commercial banks’ obligatory exposure to the priority sector and those concerning treatment of 
non-performing assets (NPA) have significant impact on the CDR of banks. Specifically, they 
render banks risk averse, and less willing to lend. Finally, we find that the second generation of 
reforms, which largely involved resolution of the NPA-related problems of the Indian banks, and 
which coincided with the end of the legal disputes over the functioning of debt recovery tribunals 
(DRTs), encouraged banks to increase disbursal of credit.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 develops the theoretical basis for 
the model used and states the model specifications. The data are discussed in Section 3 and the 
result in Section 4.  Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Modelling bank behavior in credit markets 
A bank is a multi-product firm, with a portfolio consisting of non-securities loans, as well 
as securities issued by non-government entities and federal, state and local governments. In 
addition, a bank generates revenues from fee-based contracts and speculation/participation in the 
market for off-balance sheet items. In developing countries, the choices facing the banks are 
usually fairly limited, partly because of government regulations, but also because of missing or 
underdeveloped markets for assets and instruments such as equity and financial derivatives.  For 
example, in India, equities accounted for less that 1 percent of the bank assets in both 1996-97 
and 2000-01. At the same time, while states, regions and local bodies in developing countries 
have different degrees of credit worthiness, the political economy of most of these countries 
ensure that all government securities carry the implicit or explicit guarantee by the federal 
government. That is, it is possible to think of banks in developing countries having two broad 
choices; they can either invest their resources, net of the cash reserve ratio and other regulatory 
caveats, into safe government securities, or disburse them as credit to the non-government sector, 
where all such credit is inherently more risky. 
Let the following be true: the return on the risk-free government bonds is rf, the expected 
return on the risky credit-related assets is E(rp), and a bank invests y proportion of its resources 
in the latter and (1 – y) proportion in the former. Then, the expected returns arising out of this 
asset allocation is given by  
] ) ( [ ) ( f P f r r E y r r E − + =                   
(1) 
Now let the utility function of the bank be given by 
2 ) ( σ A r E U − =                   
(2) 
where σ  is the risk associated with the asset allocation strategy, and A is the extent of risk 
averseness of the bank. The optimization program of the bank is then by  U Max
y  resulting in y* 
as a function of E(rp), rf, σ and A.  
If an empirical analysis is limited to a single country, with limited capital account 
convertibility, then, for any year, rf  (i.e., some average of the returns on government securities 
of different maturities) is similar across all banks. Hence, cross-sectional variation in y* (i.e.,   9
CDR) across banks can be explained by variations in the returns on the non-government assets, 
the risks associated with these assets, and the degrees of risk aversion of the individual banks. 
The CDR of a bank would be expected to increase with the expected return on the non-
government assets, and decrease with the risk associated with such assets and also the degree of 
risk averseness. Asset pricing theory suggests that risk and return are positively related.
ii  
Alternatively, since a bank loan is similar to a coupon bond held until maturity, the risk 
associated with a bank loan is a credit risk, not an interest rate risk, and it can be argued that the 
expected returns from a bank loan is simply a linear function of the credit risk. In other words, 
the inclusion of both a measure of risk and expected returns in the specification is likely to give 
rise to collinearity. Therefore, the specification can be further reduced to a functional 
relationship between the CDR and both the credit risk associated with loan disbursals and the 
risk averseness of the banks. 
Given that banking is a relationship-based activity, the borrower pool for any bank is 
usually restricted by the geographical coverage of its branch network, and its regions of 
operation. In this study, geographical coverage is measured by the number of branches.
iii Further, 
it is important to consider that the policy legacies of Indian banks that led to large rural networks 
(see Bhaumik and Mukherjee, 2002), and treat Indian as being comprised of broadly two large 
regions, rural and urban. This is taken into account by using the proportion of the branch network 
that is in rural areas. Since a large branch network enables a bank to minimize the risk associated 
with its portfolio by diversification across a large number of borrowers, it is expected that the 
CDR increases with the size of the branch network (BRANCHES). On the other hand, given the 
reasonable assumption that inadequate collateral, missing secondary markets for collateral, and 
higher transactions costs associated with contract enforcement in areas that are not well 
connected to urban centers, plus the political economy of loan forgiveness, make credit disbursal 
in the rural market more risky than the urban credit market.  Thus, it is expected that CDR is 
inversely related to the proportion of branches in the rural areas (RURAL). 
The risk averseness of a bank can arise from two different sources. Firstly, a bank may be 
innately risk averse, but may also be reluctant to take risk on account of factors such as, the 
impact of past behavior with respect to credit decisions. In India, the degree of innate risk 
averseness bank is not difficult to measure, and initially, it can be argued that banks with 
different ownership patterns (OWNERSHIP) have different levels of innate risk averseness.   10
However, it is difficult to predict a priori the exact relationship between ownership and risk 
averseness. For example, in principle, it can be argued that a foreign bank may be more risk 
averse than a domestic bank due to less knowledge of local credit markets and fewer informal 
options with respect to enforcing contracts. On the other hand, it can also be argued that the 
Indian assets account for a very small proportion of the overall asset base and therefore a foreign 
bank would be willing to take risk to capture market share. 
The second measure of innate risk averseness in banks is likely to have a predictable 
relationship with the choice of CDR. All banks in India are required by the Reserve Bank of 
India (RBI) to maintain 25 percent of deposits in the form of safe and liquid assets, mostly in the 
form of government securities. However, since the mid 1990s, most banks have voluntarily 
invested much more than 25 percent of their assets in government securities, behavior that in 
Indian policy circles as “lazy banking”. The rationale for lazy banking is the risk associated with 
credit disbursal in a developing country with attendant economic cycles and underdeveloped 
legal institutions to enforce contracts, and also awareness of the responsible banks that they may 
not have the necessary expertise to screen potential borrowers.  Thus, lazy banking is a 
manifestation of risk averseness. Therefore the ratio of banks’ exposure to government securities, 
as a percentage of deposits, in excess of the required 25 percent, to the median exposure of all 
the banks in the sample, is used as a measure of risk averseness (ExGOV securities).
iv  Clearly, a 
high value for this variable would indicate a high degree of risk averseness. In order to avoid 
endogeneity problems, the risk aversion variable is lagged one period. 
Legacy may also have an impact on the risk averseness of a bank in two different ways. 
Given that the Indian banks are expected to abide by the prudential norms laid down by the RBI, 
if past lending of a bank results in accumulation of non-performing assets, it imposes a cost on 
the bank in the form of both higher capital requirements and higher cost of capital. This cost of 
capital might then cause a bank to restrict its lending activities so as to reduce further the capital 
requirement. Conversely, a bank with a large stock of bad or doubtful assets may wish to expand 
operations rapidly to make up for past losses and/or to become too big to fail (see, e.g., Randall, 
1993). Hence, in this study, past evidence of NPA is used as a measure of regulation and/or 
legacy induced risk averseness (NPA). 
The RBI also requires banks to reserve a stipulated minimum share of disbursed credit for 
the priority sector, which is comprised largely of agriculture and small firms. Banerjee, Cole and   11
Duflo (2003) have noted that the average risk associated with priority sector lending is high, 
thereby giving banks an incentive to not fulfil their priority sector obligations, if possible. 
Cognizant of this agency problem, the RBI imposes a statutory penalty on banks that fail to meet 
their priority sector obligations; a “defaulting” bank is required to invest the difference between 
its required and actual exposures to the priority sector in government bonds yielding below-
market rates of return. Despite the penalty, however, data suggest that in any given year some 
banks are unable to meet the RBI regulation on priority sector lending. This raises the possibility 
that either the penalty is not well enforced or that the penalty is not commensurate with the gains 
accruing to a bank that does not expose itself significantly to the risky priority sector. In other 
words, if a bank does not meet the minimum required exposure to the priority sector in year t-1, 
there are two possible outcomes in year t. The bank can either decide that the RBI’s priority 
sector lending norms are not well enforced, or it braces for a RBI-imposed penalty and hence 
compensates for its errant past by increasing its exposure to priority sector lending. In the former 
case, the risk averseness of the bank in period t is likely to decline while, in the latter case, its 
risk averseness in that period is likely to increase. As with investment in government securities, a 
proxy for this risk aspect of aversion is the ratio of a bank’s distance from the RBI mandated 
lower limit for priority sector exposure to the median distance of all the banks in the sample 
(PRIORITY). Risk averseness would increase or decrease with this measure depending upon the 
effectiveness with which the RBI enforces priority sector lending requirements. As above, 
possible endogeneity is avoided by using a lagged value in the estimation.  
Further, as discussed earlier, it may be important to take account of the possibility of 
persistence, that is, whether CDR in time period t is significantly dependent on the CDR in time 
period t-1.  This outcome may be due to the relationship-based nature of banking, or is evidence 
of the inability of banks to assess credit risk associated with individual loan applications 
effectively (Banerjee and Duflo, 2002).  Thus, from the above discussion, we get the following 
two specifications of the model: 
CDRi,t = f(Branchesi,t, Rurali,t, Ownershipi,t, ExGOV securitiesi,t-1, NPAi,t-1, Priorityi,t-1,)           
(3a) 
and 
CDRi,t = f(CDRi,t-1, Branchesi,t, Rurali,t, Ownershipi,t, ExGOV securitiesi,t-1, NPAi,t-1, Priorityi,t-1,)        
(3b)   12
  Finally, we have to take into account the impact of the overall state of the economy (that 
drives the demand for credit), and regulatory changes on the impact on the CDR of banks. The 
rationale for controlling for the demand for credit (DEMAND) remains in the significant 
volatility in India’s industrial and overall growth rates since the mid 1990s (see Figure 1). It is 
evident from Figure 1 that there is little correlation between the GDP and industrial growth rate 
in India, which is not surprising given that services accounted for a significant proportion of the 
GDP during this time period, eventually accounting for over 50 percent of the GDP by 2003-04. 
Further, the agricultural sector continues to account for nearly a quarter of India’s GDP, and this 
sector has witnessed significant fluctuations since 1995-96, witnessing booms and negative (or 
near zero) growth rates in rapid succession. Hence, we separately use both the GDP and 
industrial growth rates (GDP and INDUSTRY, respectively) in the specification, without any 
prior as to which would be a better control for the demand for credit. Our interest lies in 
examining whether the impact of the other variables change significantly once these controls are 
included in the specification. 
 
Figure 1 
 
The inclusion of a control for changes in banking regulations – broadly defined, the 
environment under which lending was undertaken – lies in the post-1990 history of banking 
reforms in India,
v where such reforms were kicked off in 1992 by the RBI, by way of adoption of 
the key recommendations of the Narasimham Committee I. Specifically, the RBI deregulated 
entry into the banking sector and removed restrictions on branch expansion by domestic and 
foreign banks alike. At the same time, banks were asked to maintain risk weighted capital 
adequacy ratio of 8 percent, mark assets to market, identify problem loans on their balance sheet, 
and make provisions for bad loans. This phase of reforms was completed by the end of the 1998-
99 financial year. In 1998, the RBI initiated the second generation of banking reforms, in 
keeping with the recommendations of Narasimham Committee II. The most important 
recommendation of the Committee was the creation of asset reconstruction companies (ARCs) to 
simultaneously improve the quality of the balance sheets of the banks and to facilitate recovery 
of loans. In a separate development, after a prolonged period of legal disputes, debt recovery 
tribunals (DRTs) began functioning in India, in earnest, by 1999 (Visaria, 2005). As we shall see   13
later, the initiation of the second round of banking sector reforms, and the removal of legal 
barriers to the functioning of the DRTs lies in the middle of the data period, and hence the need 
to control for this regulatory change We use as the control a dummy variable (RCHANGE) that 
takes the value 1 for 1999-00 and all subsequent years, and value zero for all years prior to 1999-
00. After taking into consideration these two controls, our specification is as follows: 
CDRi,t = f(CDRi,t-1, Branchesi,t, Rurali,t, Ownershipi,t, ExGOV securitiesi,t-1, NPAi,t-1, Priorityi,t-1,  
Demandt, Rchange)                       (3c) 
 
3. Data 
The model has been estimated largely using data obtained from the Indian Banks’ 
Association. The data on NPAs were obtained from various issues of Trends and Progress of 
Banking in India, published by the RBI annually, and the GDP and industrial growth rates of 
India were obtained from the 2003-04 pre-budget Economic Survey published by the 
Government of India. The empirical analysis involves the use of data from nine financial years: 
1995-96 through 2003-04. However, the use of lagged values in the specification results in the 
use of data from only years 1996-97 through 2003-04 for the regression analysis. The data 
suggests that although there were 36 foreign banks registered in India during the period, the 
largest 12 banks accounted for nearly 90 percent of the deposit and asset base of this group. 
Foreign banks with less than two branches were removed as these were considered to located in 
India to trade credit and services related to cross-border transactions and were not involved in the 
credit market. The final sample is comprised of 27 public sector banks, 24 incumbent domestic 
private sector banks which had been in operation prior to liberalization of the banking sector, 8 
de novo domestic private sector banks which started operation after liberalization, and 12 foreign 
banks. Together, they account for approximately 98 percent of the deposits and assets of the 
Indian banking sector. 
 
Table 1 
 
The summary statistics for the data are in Table 1. Two measures of CDR are reported, 
the ratio of non-securities advances to deposits (CDR1), and the ratio of the sum of non-
securities and securities loans to deposits (CDR2). The descriptive statistics indicate the   14
following: (a) the CDR of the foreign banks are noticeably higher than those of the domestic 
banks, and (b) over time, the unlikely duo of public sector banks and foreign banks have 
expanded their exposure to the Indian credit market much more rapidly than the incumbent and 
de novo private banks. An explanation for the former is that, as wholly owned subsidiaries of 
overseas banks, foreign banks often make loans within India using deposits raised abroad and 
resources mobilized through the money market, which means that the credit disbursed in India is 
high as a proportion of deposits collected in India. The interesting aspect of this observation is 
that  a priori public sector banks and foreign banks in India can be expected to have very 
different attitudes towards credit risk in a rapidly growing emerging market with mixed record of 
GDP and industrial growth in the recent past (see Figure 1).  
The public sector banks are prone to moral hazard, on account of their ownership, on the 
one hand, and, on the other hand, face the spectre of political pressures to keep their balance 
sheets clean (Banerjee and Duflo, 2002). The foreign banks face a different type of dilemma. On 
the one hand, they risk accumulating doubtful assets on their consolidated balance sheets by 
exposing themselves too much to India, and, on the other hand, they are comforted by the fact 
that for most of these banks their Indian operations constitute a small fraction of their worldwide 
consolidated balance sheet such that accumulation of doubtful assets in India is not likely to have 
a significant impact on their own creditworthiness or financial health in general. The fact that 
these two very different types of organizations exhibited similar behavior in the Indian credit 
market lends further validity to our empirical exercise, which seeks to unravel the determinants 
of credit market behavior of banks in an emerging market. 
The data on the exposure of the banks to government securities suggests that public 
sector banks buy government securities over and above the Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) 
requirement. The figures reported in Table 1 (ExGOV securities) suggest that, in 1996-97, the 
excess holding of government securities by an average public sector bank, over and above the 
SLR floor, was 14.63 times higher than the excess holding of such securities by the median bank. 
Foreign banks too are over-exposed to the government securities, but the extent of their over-
exposure is modest, especially in comparison with the exposure of the public sector banks. Even 
though the exposure of public sector banks to these securities has declined over time, relative to 
the other/median bank(s), as indicated by the multiple of 7.57 in 2003-04, it still remains a 
significantly large multiple, providing prima facie evidence about the so-called “lazy banking”   15
(at least) among banks that control about 80 percent of the deposits mobilised in India, and a 
similar proportion of the country’s banking sector assets.  
The data also indicates that the average Indian bank does not meet the regulatory 
obligation with respect to priority sector lending during the period of analysis. The figures 
reported in Table 1 (PRIORITY) suggest that, ironically, the public sector banks are more in 
default of their priority sector obligations, relative to the median banks, than the other types of 
banks. Given the multiple of 1.18, the median bank in 1996-97 was very likely a foreign bank. 
The extent of default of the public sector banks increased marginally between 1996-97 and 2003-
04, relative to the median bank, which, by the latter year, was an incumbent private bank. The 
passage of time also witnessed a significant increase in the extent of default by de novo private 
banks and foreign banks, once again relative to the median bank. Widespread default with 
respect to the RBI’s priority sector norms raises the question as to whether the penalty imposed 
by the central bank on errant commercial banks has any effect on the latter’s behavior. However, 
this cannot be addressed on the basis of the descriptive statistics, and would have to await formal 
regression analysis.  
Finally, four different measures of NPA are reported, reflecting those disclosed by the 
RBI; the ratio of gross NPA to total assets (NPA1), the ratio of net NPA to total assets (NPA2), 
the ratio of gross NPA to total advances (NPA3) and the ratio of net NPA to total advances 
(NPA4). Not surprisingly, the public sector banks had more NPA on their balance sheets in 
1996-97, but they were able to reduce this considerably over time, even though there was an 
increase in NPAs on the balance sheet of the de novo private banks and the foreign banks. The 
increase in the NPA exposure of these two categories of banks was probably inevitable, given the 
expansion of business following liberalization. However, it is remarkable that the old private 
banks were unable to reduce their exposure to NPA, unlike those in the public sector. This is 
consistent with the earlier discussion of the performance of the public sector banks, which has 
improved significantly over time.  The old private banks have emerged as the new laggards 
(Bhaumik and Dimova, 2004). 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
The regression results are reported in Tables 2 and 3.  Both tables report the coefficient 
estimates, with columns 1-4 showing the sample of domestic banks, and columns 5-8 all banks.   16
Coefficient estimates were obtained separately for the two (overlapping) samples because, unlike 
the domestic banks, foreign banks can use deposits from outside India, and a substantial part of 
their resources from the money market. Hence it is not obvious that a domestic bank and a 
foreign bank operating in India are similar. In Table 2 CDR is the ratio of nonsecuritized 
advances to deposits, while in Table 3 CDR is the ratio of the total securitized and non-securities 
loans to deposits. Columns (1) and (5) in both tables are generated from specification (3a), 
columns (2) and (6) report coefficient estimates for specification (3b), and columns (3), (4), (7) 
and (8) are derived from specification (3c). We estimate the models using different measures of 
NPA but the measures are highly correlated and hence choice of any one measure over the others 
does not affect the results. In Tables 2 and 3, therefore, we report on the specifications that 
include gross NPA as a percentage of total assets (NPA1). 
We estimate the specifications using both fixed effects and random effects models, and 
determine the choice between these two types of models using the stylized Hausman test. The 
test statistics reject random effects in favor of fixed effects. Hence, only fixed effects models are 
reported in the aforementioned tables. Since the ownership of Indian banks did not change 
during the period for which the sample is constructed, despite events like the significant 
acquisition of (incumbent private) Vysya Bank shares by (foreign) ING, the OWNERSHIP 
variable drops out of the specifications used to estimate the fixed effects model. We make the 
additional assumption that in the event of acquisition of bank i by bank j, we can treat banks 
separately prior to the acquisition, and treat the merged entity simply as bank j thereafter. This 
assumption, which is consistent with the literature on M&A, simply suggests that banks i and j 
have different risk appetites and, in general, different credit market behavior prior to the 
acquisition and that, subsequent to the acquisition, the behavior of the merged entity will be the 
same as that of the acquiring bank. Further, even the acquisition of relatively large banks in India 
– e.g., Madura Bank and ANZ Grindlays by ICICI and Standard Chartered, respectively – have 
involved target banks that together accounted for very small fractions of the deposit and credit 
markets. Indeed the deposit and asset base of the banks acquired by ICICI, HDFC and Standard 
Chartered together accounted for less than 0.5 percent of the overall deposit and asset base of the 
banks included in the sample, and the missing values generated for the target banks in the post-
M&A years account for less than 0.5 percent of the observations. Hence, we are confident that 
our approach, which gives rise to an unbalanced panel, with the acquired banks dropping out of   17
the sample after the year(s) of acquisition, does not affect the results in any way. 
The F statistics for each of the models is significant at the 5 percent level, with almost all 
significant at the 1 percent level. Further, the results are remarkably robust to the choice of both 
specifications and samples. Collectively, they suggest that our specifications are a good fit for 
the data. However, it is evident from the F statistics that specifications (3b) and (3c) fit the data 
much better than does specification (3a), irrespective of the definition of CDR and irrespective of 
the choice of sample. 
 
Tables 2 and 3 
 
The results indicate that, to begin with, there is a strong persistence in the CDR of Indian 
banks. While such correlation between the dependent and the lagged dependent variable is not 
unusual in time series and panel data, it is, nevertheless, is consistent with the findings of 
Banerjee and Duflo (2002). As noted above, this could simply be a consequence of the nature of 
banking which is a relationship-based activity but could also indicate that Indian banks are not 
skilled at evaluating the credit worthiness of potential debtors, thereby rewarding the moribund 
yet stable businesses at the expense of new or dynamic enterprises that have an expected flow of 
income that is more volatile. While we would prefer to be conservative about the interpretation 
of this result, at the very least, it suggests that the credit application evaluation procedures of 
Indian banks deserve a careful scrutiny. 
Secondly, banks with larger branch networks lend a greater proportion of their resources. 
Since the fixed effect model controls for ownership, which did not change for any of the banks 
during the sample period, the BRANCHES variable is clearly not picking up ownership effects. 
Further, since we control for past lending by the banks using a lagged dependent variable (in 
columns 2-4 and 6-8 of both tables), BRANCHES is not picking up lending relationships of the 
banks either. In other words, there is support for our prior that if a bank has access to a wide pool 
of potential borrowers, such that it both has a better choice of the latter and can spread its credit 
risk across a larger borrower pool, it is likely to lend more. This result clearly has implications 
for the size of the bank, and brings into focus the possible macroeconomic gains arising out of 
consolidation of the small incumbent private banks (or their takeover by de novo private or 
foreign banks) through M&A.   18
Thirdly, both the priority sector norms of the RBI and prudential norms with respect to 
NPA on a bank’s balance sheet have a significant (and negative) impact on the CDR of the 
banks. The former suggests that the penalty imposed by the RBI on banks that do not meet their 
priority sector obligations are significant. If a bank does not meet its priority sector obligation in 
period t, it faces penalty. This, in turn, reduces the bank’s willingness to lend in period t+1, 
given that a fixed proportion of its lending has to be allocated to the priority sector and that it 
will face further penalties if it defaults on its obligations once again. Given that an average 
Indian bank is in default of its priority sector obligations in all the years in the sample suggests 
that these banks do not find lending to this sector profitable. At the same time, the RBI’s penalty 
for defaulters is significant such that such default is not costless, and this has a negative impact 
on the willingness of the banks to lend. It is perhaps time for the RBI to initiate a debate about 
the possible impacts of allowing commercial banks a free hand in credit allocation, and 
development of an alternative institutional framework along the lines of the National Bank for 
Agricultural and Rural Development (NABARD) for credit delivery to the priority sector. 
The negative coefficient of NPA suggests that NPA accumulation on the balance sheet of 
an average Indian bank is more likely to make it conservative in its credit allocation decisions, 
rather than encourage it to take more risk in a bid to become too-big-to-fail. This is consistent 
with the ownership pattern of banks in India where about 85 percent of bank assets are either 
with public sector banks that cannot fail by definition, or with incumbent private sector banks 
that are closely held, and likely to have risk averse managers making active decisions on credit 
assessment. To the extent that prudential norms were introduced to make the banks lend more 
prudently, and thereby avoid unnecessary risk, therefore, the RBI’s regulatory strategy is clearly 
working. But this result also suggests that, in keeping with the recommendations with 
Narasimham Committee II, the government will have to develop and consolidate institutions that 
would enable the banks to clean their balance sheets of NPA in order to facilitate further 
deepening of the credit market. Visaria (2005) has demonstrated that DRTs, that facilitate 
enforcement of the debt covenant in the event of a default by a borrower, have encouraged 
greater lending on the part of an Indian bank.
vi This can potentially be supplemented by 
introduction of financial instruments (e.g., credit derivatives) and the development of an 
institutional framework (e.g., Ginnie Mae, Freddie Mac) that can enable banks to hedge against 
credit risk, or completely remove risky assets from their balance sheets.   19
Finally, the positive sign of the RCHANGE variable indicates that the banks’ role as 
financial intermediaries was facilitated by the second generation of reforms. Given that the 
second generation of reforms were largely aimed at reducing the NPA burden of the banks, and 
given that the resultant emergence of ARCs coincided with the removal of legal barriers on the 
functioning of DRTs across the country, this result is not surprising, and is consistent with our 
result concerning the impact of NPA on a bank’s willingness to lend. 
  
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper focuses on the behavior of banks operating in emerging markets where they 
have the choice of disbursing resources collected through deposits either as credit to commercial 
borrowers or as investment into sovereign securities. Commercial credit in these countries carry 
credit risk as well as liquidity risk, given the high cost of liquidating collateral for such credit, 
and the absence of markets for hedging these risks. Sovereign securities, on the other hand, carry 
near zero default risk, and a relatively low level of liquidity risk. The paper highlights three 
aspects of bank behavior in the context of such emerging markets that are not captured by the 
literature that focuses on the relationship between ownership and performance of banks. 
Our results indicate that the credit market behavior of banks in emerging markets is 
influenced largely determined by past trends, presumably limiting significantly the ability of new 
and dynamic firms and sectors to grow rapidly. There is also evidence to support the hypothesis 
that prudential regulations have a significant impact on bank behavior with respect to credit 
disbursal, by making these decisions sensitive to the prevailing stock of NPAs. Regulations also 
have an impact on bank-lending in India by way of the priority sector norms of the RBI; these 
norms make banks less willing to disburse credit. Finally, we find evidence that the second 
generation of reforms in India, the thrust of which was the enablement of banks to clear NPA off 
their balance sheets, had a positive impact on the credit disbursal of the banks. 
The results are instructive, and consistent with our priors about bank-behavior in the 
context of lending in an emerging market. They also raise some policy issues like, e.g., the 
efficacy of the priority sector norms. But while decisions on issues like priority sector lending 
are likely to be made in the political arena, and while consolidation of incumbent private banks 
by way of M&A can hardly be a policy objective, the results indicate that, given that the Indian 
banks are demonstratively risk averse, there is a politically neutral policy issue that can and   20
should be addressed with immediate effect.  
 
Figure 2 
 
Indian banks are already in a position to mitigate credit risk by way of securitisation of 
debt, i.e., they can lend by way of commercial paper (CP) rather than through conventional credit 
agreements. The CPs are mandatorily rated by accredited credit rating agencies, and, to the 
extent that the banks invest in only high grade CPs, lending by way of these financial 
instruments can reduce the capital adequacy requirement. Banks investing in corporate CPs also 
benefit from the fact that since it is technically an investment, it is not subject to the priority 
sector norms of the RBI. However, while these two aspects of CPs is widely discussed in Indian 
policy circles, much less attention is paid to the fact that CPs have a fairly liquid secondary 
market, and hence liquidity risk (and therefore the overall risk) associated with them is lower 
than the risk associated with non-securitised or conventional lending. Figure 2 suggests that the 
proportion of bank credit disbursed by way of CPs and other corporate securities was particularly 
higher during the years of economic uncertainty (1998-2000) than in the other years, especially 
among foreign banks. In the light of our results, therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that the 
development of the market for corporate bonds in India, which remains mired in a number of 
problems (Bhaumik, Bose and Coondoo, 2003), should remain a priority of the government. 
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Figure 1 
GDP and industrial growth in India: 1996-97 to 2003-04 
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 Source : Economic Survey, Government of India, 2004-05   24
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  1996-97 2003-04 
  Public  Old private  New private  Foreign  Public  Old private  New private  Foreign 
CDR1       0.4651  0.5220  0.5666  0.8002  0.5141  0.5078  0.5901  0.9453 
         (0.0786)  (0.1142)  (0.1037)  (0.2038) (0.1196)  (0.0981)  (0.1695)  (0.4156) 
CDR2       0.5153  0.5738  0.6528  0.8324  0.5698  0.5789  0.6485  1.0141 
         (0.0770)  (0.1195)  (0.0818)  (0.2034) (0.1174)  (0.1070)  (0.1835)  (0.3961) 
BRANCHES    1652.9260  173.4000  15.1250  11.9166  1703.4810  220.2500  159.5556  16.4166 
     (1672.7790)  (115.6525)  (3.8706)  (15.5648)  (1672.9500)  (134.6422)  (143.0123)  (20.0656) 
RURAL  64.8714  58.4732 13.7325 0  61.8748  55.1125 23.9333 0 
  (7.7677)  (17.9232) (16.9906) (0)  (6.6014)  (13.1328) (10.5404) (0) 
ExGOV Securities  14.6317  0.0181 0.0632  1.8009  7.5722  0.3660 2.1721  0.7758 
  (24.7834) (1.4047)  (0.6446)  (1.5349)  (14.3349) (0.2630)  (4.1512)  (1.4996) 
PRIORITY  4.7358  0.4751 0.5475  1.1858  5.1327  1.2033 9.4376  4.0039 
  (6.6319) (0.4976)  (0.3280)  (0.8521)  (21.4612) (1.9739) (16.0672)  (5.0986) 
NPA1  7.9940  4.7758 1.1150  2.8516  3.4292 4.223 3.8866  3.3300 
  (3.3547) (2.3078)  (1.1845)  (4.4147)  (1.4651) (1.9024)  (5.6829)  (3.2431) 
NPA2  3.8388  2.6566 0.7950  1.6425  1.2062  2.3115 1.8366  1.8050 
  (1.6875) (1.1796)  (0.8053)  (3.1369)  (1.0199) (1.2978)  (2.7033)  (2.5491) 
NPA3  18.5285  10.9250 2.6550  5.0383  7.5803  9.0280 8.8255  6.6741 
  (7.7544) (5.3247)  (2.2409)  (5.9733)  (3.3842) (3.7701) (14.0006)  (6.6584) 
NPA4  9.9381  6.5279 1.7487  2.8641  2.7559  4.7490 4.9344  3.6275 
  (4.5796) (2.6007)  (1.6462)  (4.7996)  (2.4716) (2.5382)  (8.8062)  (5.2512) 
Notes:  The numbers within parentheses are standard deviations.   25
 
Table 2: Determinants of credit allocation 
LHS variable = Advances/Deposits 
  Domestic banks  All banks: domestic and foreign 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
BRANCHES    0.0002 ***    0.0002 ***    0.0002 ***    0.0002 ***    0.0002 ***    0.0002 ***    0.0002 ***    0.0002 *** 
    (0.00006)    (0.00005)    (0.0006)    (0.00006)    (0.00008)    (0.00007)    (0.00008)    (0.00008) 
RURAL    0.00007  - 0.00002    0.00008    0.00007    0.00005  - 0.00004    0.0002    0.0001 
    (0.0003)    (0.0003)    (0.0003)    (0.0003)    (0.0005)    (0.0004)    (0.0004)    (0.0004) 
ExGOV securities    0.00001    0.0001    0.0002    0.0002    0.0001    0.0001    0.0003    0.0003 
    (0.0002)    (0.0002)    (0.0002)    (0.0002)    (0.0003)    (0.0003)    (0.0003)    (0.0003) 
PRIORITY    0.0003  - 0.0064 ***  - 0.0065 **  - 0.0065 ***    0.0003  - 0.0065 ***  - 0.0066 ***  - 0.0066 *** 
    (0.0003)    (0.0009)    (0.0009)    (0.0009)    (0.0004)    (0.0007)    (0.0007)    (0.0007) 
NPA  - 0.0052 **  - 0.0038 **  - 0.0033 *  - 0.0033 *  - 0.0064 ***  - 0.0054 ***  - 0.0047 **  - 0.0047 ** 
    (0.0020)    (0.0019)    (0.0019)    (0.0019)    (0.0021)    (0.0019)     (0.0019)    (0.0019) 
CDR1(-1)      0.4440 ***    0.4504 ***    0.4523 ***      0.4467 ***    0.4525 ***    0.4551 *** 
      (0.0610)    (0.0613)    (0.0617)      (0.0433)    (0.0431)    (0.0434) 
RCHANGE        0.0123    0.0121        0.0302 ***    0.0309 *** 
        (0.0080)    (0.0081)        (0.0302)    (0.0098) 
GDP        0.0005          0.0002   
        (0.0024)          (0.0029)   
INDUSTRY     -  0.0002     -  0.0011 
          (0.0024)          (0.0029) 
Constant    0.3098 ***    0.0416    0.0391    0.0431    0.4076 ***    0.1248 *    0.1291 *    0.1365 
    (0.0612)    (0.0682)    (0.0694)    (0.0690)    (0.0719)    (0.0703)    (0.0714)    (0.0713) 
          
F-statistic    4.57 ***    13.16 ***    10.18 ***    10.17 ***    3.44 ***    21.21 ***    17.42 ***    17.45 *** 
Sample size    444    444    444    444    535    535    535    535 
Notes:  1. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
  2. The numbers within parentheses are standard errors.   26
 
Table 3: Determinants of credit allocation 
LHS variable = (Advances + Corporate debt securities)/Deposits 
  Domestic banks  All banks: domestic and foreign 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
BRANCHES    0.0002 ***    0.0002 ***    0.0002 ***    0.0002 ***    0.0002 **    0.0002 ***    0.0002 ***    0.0001 ** 
    (0.00006)    (0.00006)    (0.00006)    (0.00006)    (0.00009)    (0.00008)    (0.00008)    (0.00008) 
RURAL    0.0001    0.0001    0.0001    0.0002    0.0001    0.0001    0.0003    0.0003 
    (0.0003)    (0.0003)    (0.0003)    (0.00006)    (0.0005)    (0.0005)    (0.0005)    (0.0005) 
ExGOV securities  - 1.69e-06    0.00009    0.0001    0.0001  - 0.00005    0.00007    0.0002    0.0003 
    (0.0002)    (0.0002)    (0.0002)    (0.0002)    (0.0003)    (0.0005)    (0.0003)    (0.0003) 
PRIORITY    0.0003  - 0.0067 ***  - 0.0066 ***  - 0.0066 ***    0.0003  - 0.0066 ***  - 0.0062 ***  - 0.0063 *** 
    (0.0003)    (0.0010)    (0.0010)    (0.0010)    (0.0004)    (0.0008)    (0.0008)    (0.0008) 
NPA  - 0.0057 ***  - 0.0035 ***  - 0.0033 *  - 0.0033 *  - 0.0060 **  - 0.0049 **  - 0.0044 **  - 0.0046 ** 
    (0.0021)    (0.0019)    (0.0020)    (0.0020)    (0.0023)    (0.0021)    (0.0021)    (0.0021) 
CDR2(-1)      0.4595 ***    0.4526 ***    0.4542 ***      0.4482 ***    0.4279 ***    0.4325 *** 
      (0.0627)    (0.0632)    (0.0632)      (0.0465)    (0.0469)    (0.0468) 
RCHANGE        0.0060    0.0091        0.0253 **    0.0319 *** 
        (0.0083)    (0.0083)        (0.0109)    (0.0110) 
GDP    -  0.0019     -  0.0033   
        (0.0024)          (0.0032)   
INDUSTRY     -  0.0026     -  0.0064  * 
          (0.0024)          (0.0033) 
Constant    0.3981 ***    0.0925    0.1128    0.1158    0.4977 ***    0.1844 **    0.2290 ***    0.2445 *** 
    (0.0631)    (0.0723)    (0.0747)    (0.0744)    (0.0789)    (0.0792)    (0.0820)    (0.0813) 
          
F-statistic    4.44 ***    13.16 ***    10.02 ***    10.10 ***    2.61 **    18.06 ***    14.65 ***    15.07 
Sample size    444    444    444    444    531    528    528    528 
Notes:  1. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
  2. The numbers within parentheses are standard errors. 
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Figure 2 
Exposure of Indian banks to corporate debt instruments 
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Endnotes 
 
 
                                                  
 
i Acknowledgements: The authors would like to thank Rudra Sensarma, Lawrence Saez, Donal McKillop, 
Viral Acharya, seminar participants at the 2003 Pacific Rim Conference of the Western Economic 
Association International, two anonymous referees and editor John P Bonin for helpful comments. This 
research has benefited from support provided by the Aditya Birla India Centre at London Business School 
with respect to collection of data. The authors remain responsible for all remaining errors. 
ii In India, for example, a bank is allowed to charge up to 400 basis points over and above its prime 
lending rate to account for increasing levels of risk. 
iii It is stylized in the literature to control for the size of the bank in the specification, in a variety of 
contexts. The usual measures of a bank’s size are it’s the stock of its deposits and the stock of its assets. 
However, the number of branches of a bank are, not surprisingly, highly collinear with both the deposit 
base and the asset size of the bank. For our sample, the correlation coefficient was greater than 0.95 for all 
the years in the sample. Hence, we did not include deposits or assets as a control variable in our 
specification. 
iv Suppose that a bank has invested 32 percent of its deposits into government securities. In that case, its 
excess holding of such securities over and above that required by the RBI is 7 percentage points. If the 
median of this excess for all banks is 10 percent, then our measure of risk averseness for this bank is 0.7. 
v See Bhaumik and Mukherjee (2002) for details about banking sector reforms in India. 
vi Like Banerjee and Duflo (2002), Visaria (2005) also uses multi-year contract-level data from one Indian 
(private sector) bank. 
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